

ABSTRACTS – FRIDAY 6 & SATURDAY 7 NOVEMBER

EDUCATION, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY



FRIDAY NOVEMBER 6

Presenter	Title	Abstract
Kunimasa Sato	<i>Good Learning and Epistemic Transformation</i>	<p>Learning involves the epistemological dimensions of our lives interpersonally and diachronically. Although learning tends to be considered exclusively relevant to the educational enterprise such as at school, it occurs throughout our epistemic practices, including at work and at home. To illustrate, suppose that a company’s employees attend a workshop to interact with disabled coworkers. This interaction may enable the employees to realize their ignorance regarding the way in which disabled people work at their company. As a consequence, the employees may become motivated to reflect on more inclusive working environments by redressing their initial stereotype about disabled people’s different abilities and skills. This exemplifies a case of good learning in which individuals not only obtain an epistemic good, such as true information, but also become epistemically sound. This learning seems an epistemically worthwhile practice in a socially and culturally diverse community.</p> <p>This paper explores a feminist virtue-epistemological account of good learning. Specifically, I argue that good learning in a socially and culturally diverse community involves being transformed into being virtuous learners. Section 2 articulates the weak neutralization of epistemically bad stereotypes as a distinct epistemic end of good learning. Section 3 draws on virtue responsibility with a feminist perspective of social situatedness to articulate a liberatory intellectual virtue conception. I, then, argue that ideal virtuous learners have an epistemic motive to neutralize epistemically bad stereotypes, a stable disposition to act accordingly, and reliable success in doing so. Section 4 captures the view that good learning must be not only epistemically valuable but also transformative. First, I articulate a form of epistemic transformation that involves neutralizing epistemically bad stereotypes. Then, I argue that despite an imperfect virtuous state, epistemic transformation has a transcendent value in learners constantly advancing toward being ideally virtuous .</p>
1 st Keynote Address: Helena Pedersen	<i>Education, Anthropocentrism, and Interspecies Sustainability: Confronting Institutional Anxieties in Omnicidal Times</i>	<p>Deborah Britzman’s (2003) remarkable question, ‘What holds education back?’, appears more urgent than ever in a world of accelerating environmental crises, climate change, and what Danielle Celermajer (2020) has described as <i>omnicide</i> – the annihilation of everything. What, then, holds education back from initiating radical change under these urgent conditions? This paper introduces the notion of ‘institutional anxiety’ as a consolidating force and explores how it may condition possibilities for resistance. Bringing examples from ethnographic fieldwork and experiences of course development in conversation with psychoanalytic and schizoanalytic thought, a key catalyst of institutional anxiety is discussed: Anxiety related to the question of the animal (Wolfe 2003) as a threat to human exceptionalism (Haraway 2008) in educational practice and research. Confronting these anxieties could open new modes of being and acting in academic space and give interspecies ethics, justice and sustainability a chance to develop in omnicidal times.</p>

Lilija Duobliene

Posthumanist Education: Do We Have to Turn Away from Child-Centered Education?

Most countries have a humanistic and child-centered education, which is being permanently renewed, claiming that still we have a problem – that the humanistic approach and child-centered access to education is not developed well enough. Thousands of specialists in the world put their efforts to keep it as the axis of education, fix it in the documents and in practice, and suddenly posthumanists are beginning to question it. What is wrong with humanistic education and child-centered education?

Donna Haraway (1991) and Rosi Braidotti (2013, 2014) did a lot to show the tragedy of our times, when *Vitruvian Man* by Leonardo da Vinci became a symbol of our times. A strong, white Man has a great power. Meanwhile the planet Earth is at risk. That is why posthumanists suggest removing man from the center of the world, and consequently to remove the humanistic paradigm and child-centered education.

Dewey's (1990, 1997) educational philosophy with the model of child-centered education constituted a substantial input into the development of humanism. A humanistic approach was also developed by Abraham Maslow (1997) and Carl Rogers (1961), during or after World War II, describing how important the self-expression of the person, the creation of self, is. Many years later, almost one century after Dewey's writings and more than half a century after Maslow's ideas, we see conditions to have changed a lot. The Second World War and the postwar period (the Nazi labor camps such as Auschwitz and the Soviet gulags), in Braidotti's (2013) words, cast doubt upon the human as the pivotal and most intelligent species in the world. This paved the way for new humanism and antihumanism, and later on the much softer movement of posthumanism. The main founders of humanistic pedagogy – American theoreticians – lived far from World War II as well as from the inhumane politics and repressions of the USSR. Jean-Paul Sartre and other European philosophers and psychologists, such as Viktor Frankl, tried to give new aspects to humanism, based on empathy, a common understanding, and existential perceptions of the world. During the second part of the 20th century, many efforts were spent on the rehabilitation of humanism and the development of child-centered education. But educational politicians, practitioners, teachers, and parents, in discussing educational problems, still repeat the question: why did we forget the child? The child, the adolescent, the youngster – the individual whom the education of today primarily serves. On the other hand, the traditional concept regarding humanism, which was popularized in education based on Maslow and Rogers ideas, is critiqued by contemporary theoreticians, as it today requires a revision – it must be supplemented or updated. Yet this is not the problem of the scholars who had discussed humanism – it is a critique of the world wherein man and only man was at its center.

The other challenge for humanism appeared with increase of nature pollution and climate change, which is related to unlimited human's use of technologies, consumerism, progress of technological inventions, forgetting that human well being depends on natural environment, other species and order of Gaia. The new perspective, the representatives of which are the posthumanists (Hayles, 1999; Haraway, 1991; Braidotti, 1913), happens to be at the center of discussions. It is discussed how the role of the human can be rethought – the individual who has an equal set of rights regardless of where on Earth one lives and of what gender, race, and nationality one is. Or are they transformed into a cyborg? But most importantly, a question is asked of whether the human can be so selfishly distinguished from among the animate beings, justified by the notion that it is the smartest creature. Without a doubt, the former unique values of the human, as well as the loss of identity (by the means of linking identity with other life forms as well as with technology), are a huge challenge for the educational field, one that is already being tackled by education researchers both by testing certain mechanisms in empirical studies and by means of educational practice.

The importance of humanism and child-centered education is still on the agenda of the Lithuanian education policy also - the homeland of the paper's author. We can find that in the main documents: *The Law on Education, 2011/2017, The Conception of a Good School, 2016; State Education Strategy 2013–2022, Code of Ethics for Educators, 2019*. They are totally oriented toward humans and pupils, without a single word about nature. I, following some philosophers of education (Snaza, 2014, Cole, 2013, 2014, Wallin, 2010), do not suggest changing one paradigm for the other, but to combine them. In other words - to treat posthumanism as continuation of human studies, then we have found ourselves living in the *Anthropocene* already and to emphasize our *living with*.

The problem lies in linking all the differently centered paradigms. The answer here is not to put somebody in the center but to create network without center. A network that would be in harmony with other species, organic and non-organic life, which description we find in actor-network theory of Bruno Latour (2005) or Gilles Deleuze's and Félix Guattari (1987) interpretation of assemblage. I suggest not to demonstrate or teach to demonstrate the power of humankind, but to teach being in a positive relationship with the rest of the world. That's is why content should be as much important as the child and why not only these two alternatives should be in the center of the discussion, but also other elements, in-human, non-human, which have huge influence over our lives.

Accordingly, more questions arise: Can we prepare a teacher for such a task? Can we control a process that is liberated in a new decentralized way? Will we ensure better results and, chiefly, an ethical resolve and the assuming of responsibility through its cultivation? Can we sacrifice high objective standards in favor of a responsible attitude and decency, while also regarding the results yet not overly emphasizing them? Finally, what place will the natural sciences take here, and what place will be given to the arts, when, on the one hand, there is a rallying call for the demand for and the breakthrough of education in the natural sciences, and, on the other, for a reflection steeped in aesthetics and the arts-infused capitalism, and the creativity and artistic alternatives arising from it? Is one more important than the other?

Currently, there are not a lot of education theoreticians who work within the posthumanist perspective; however, their number is increasing rapidly, leaded by Nathan Snaza (2014). They are united by the fact that they all pay a lot of attention to the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 1994), Braidotti (2013) and Haraway (1991), Latour (2005) also, which, alongside other authors, become the central axis. A great task, according to Braidotti, now falls upon the humanities and their teaching, the interference of which into the public and academic discourse of economic and technological knowing and development can greatly adjust the progress that is now becoming the scourge of both the planet and humankind. So we see an emergence of a new, refreshing, positive attitude that is less deprecative and not pugnacious; instead, it creates and offers means of creation to others.

We see the grow of needs for STEM and on the other hand – how the links between education, culture, and nature are complicated by the digital world and information technology, which infringe upon the cultural field and influence education the most. In this way, I am following the abovementioned researchers, especially Braidotti, who stress that precisely the humanitarian sciences and their reinforcement in education may have crucial impact on adjusting the economic, natural-scientific and technological development of the world. However, the significance of humanitarian disciplines is entirely different from that of humanism as a philosophy and ideology – especially when it is actively implemented in education. But what is even more fresh is that teaching material is not a set of ready-made information, but in many cases a flow of information, information that is very new; hence, our task is to be ready for the perception of this flow, for new inventions and experiments to take place side by side with respect to the knowledge that has been gathered and transmitted for

many years. The usage of new concepts, which mostly came from Deleuze-Guattarian vocabulary (*rhizome, transversality, nomad, becoming, in-betweenness, schizoanalysis, affect, people-yet-to-come* etc.) are significant for the new paradigmatic turn in education. The arrival of this usage is meant to not only change the way we think but to also decode education. Understandably, the approval of the big political domain can hardly be expected for the implementation of such a philosophy; therefore, we delve into how micropolitics can neither be adverse to the official policy nor directly follow it. Its being “in between” becomes an enigma the solution of which cannot be achieved just by using the texts written by educators on micropolitics (e.g., those by Stephen J. Ball, 1987 or Andy Hargreaves, 2000); a completely new perspective is needed, the representatives of which are Deleuze, Guattari, and Braidotti, as well as their adherents in education: Buchanan (2014), Semetsky (2006), Jagodzinski (2010), Thompson (2010). The concept of “people-yet-to-come” enters the agenda; this concept might be used to denote individuals with a new consciousness: the children and adolescents for educating whom we must properly prepare.

Will the school and education be able to recode, to reboot their activities, or will they again be beaten by the capitalistic system, based on competitions? How much effort ought to be put in so as to open our own activities to innovations and change the way of thinking and the established codes, to shift from an evidence-based thinking pattern and a thinking based on the reason-outcome principle only and to proceed to a new reasoning method – one that is responsible and based on creativity, novelty, random discoveries, and connections between heterogeneous elements: material and virtual, human and non-human, potential and actual? This is a rhetorical question, and an uncomfortable one for many. For the time being, we do not lay claim to the majority with this new philosophy; we only aspire for the minority, and, in following Wallin (2010) we propose to it the following experimental tools and tactics: the molar (static), the supple (elastic), and the radical, which breaks away from the set limits (the line of flight), also *live curriculum* instead of *planned curriculum*. All these tactics should be combined during creative experiments, a collective expression and self-expression. Perhaps this perspective is not easily adaptable to small and not enough powerful states, especially such as Lithuania is. Of course Lithuania, by listening to what the world’s theoreticians are saying, should turn toward its own field – toward its own “people-yet-to-come.” It is known that they first come through education, and the gates of variety and experimentation should be opened for them. That is why group of Vilnius University scholars in the field of education started to work on development and implementation of posthumanistic paradigm into practice; first of all into educational university studies of all levels and for this aim collaborate with philosophers and science specialists. That is micropolitical, not macropolitical policy.

We have to take the risk of creating not in accordance with the already-established requirements but to act alone or together, inventing, transforming, aestheticizing, and, finally, politicizing in a fresh way. The best way to do that is to decentralize education, but not in an institutional sense – in the sense of priorities and values, and to claim not the student-, the content-, or the teacher-centered education, but a no-one-centered education instead – education linking heterogeneous elements in networks. Such is a network of different elements that have their special place in education: the student, teacher, content, ideas, imagination, symbols, technologies, other species, and the flow of information. This is not to be done from one, two or more alternatives either – the conjunctions we are looking for in this case are And, And, And, And..., as suggested by Deleuze and Parnet (1987). And if we want to keep this word, “centered,” for more pragmatic purposes – the suggestion would be to put all of these elements at the center.

<p>Merete Wiberg</p>	<p><i>Solidarity in the Key of Life – An educational value that combines critique and hope</i></p>	<p>‘Solidarity in the key of life’ expresses the idea that human beings share the responsibility for the environment of the globe and the good life of all living beings. The concept ‘solidarity in the key of life’ elaborates on the idea of solidarity and turns it into a view of mutual human responsibility for life on the globe. I will argue that the notion of ‘solidarity in the key of life’ should be a value of practice in educational processes to deal with challenges concerning the global environment and climate change in a school setting.</p> <p>Legitimizing the idea of solidarity in the key of life as an educational value</p> <p>The argument concerning the legitimizing of the concept of 'solidarity in the key of life' as a relevant educational value is as follows:</p> <p>Solidarity addresses agreement and support for the members of a group. The environment across all parts of the globe is 'common' because human and other influences on ecosystems do not stop at the national borders. We are all in the same boat. Human beings should take responsibility for the environment because human beings are the ones who see, discover, reflect on and deal with values (Hartmann, 2007 p.45). Other living creatures such as animals and plants do, as far as we know, not deal with and reflect on values and therefore, they cannot take responsibility in a human sense. Therefore, to pass on the responsibility concerning the condition of the environment as a shared ‘common’; solidarity in the key of life must be an educational value of practice to be communicated, discovered, practiced and discussed in educational settings.</p> <p>For children and young persons, the environmental challenge concerns generational matters. The new generation inherits the doings of the ages before them. They stand in the gap between past and future (Arendt, 2006). They are the ones to decide what to carry into the future. Education is the place where new generations learn from old ages. Ideally, it is also the place for democratic formation, reflection and critical thinking. The idea of 'solidarity in the key' of life is to be carefully scrutinized and discussed in the classroom.</p> <p>This land is our land</p> <p>The American philosopher Jedediah Purdy reflects on the idea of 'common' and 'commonwealth' in his recent book <i>This Land is Our Land</i> (Purdy, 2019). According to Purdy, there is no discussion about whether the world's problems are common:</p> <p>“The question is not whether the world’s problems will become everyone’s problems, but on what terms they will. Militarized borders, resource wars, and inequality that grows as its ecological and economic faces interact: These are the feature of a re-barbarized world in which people and peoples do not even try to live in reciprocity or aim at any shared horizon beyond the ecological scarcity that presses down inequitably on everyone.” (Purdy 2019, p. xxii)</p> <p>Purdy argues that a “renewed social solidarity is an integral part of realistic climate policy” (Purdy 2019, p.19). Purdy integrates this point in the ambiguous title of the book 'This Land is Our Land'. By ‘land’ he means ground, earth, territory and ‘homeland’, where the last-mentioned mostly refers to United States of America. The ambiguity, Purdy addresses, is the issue of "what it means for the land to be ours" (Purdy, p. xxiv).</p> <p>On the one hand, people share land while on the other hand; someone because of ownership has the right to claim and to be in power of the earth. An often-used example in the book is coal mining. Coal mining influences and destroy the ground as well as the environment in a broad sense. Besides, workers in coalmines suffer from working underground.</p>
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'The land remembers' is a poetical line from the book, which is followed by "With forgetting, the way things are sinks into the land itself as if it became nature (Purdy, xvii). In Denmark, 62 percent of the country is agricultural land. Only 14 percent of the country is forest. Very often Danes consider the countryside as nature. They might have forgotten what the land was before ploughing and fertilization of earth and therefore, agriculture sinks into the ground.

Dealing with the value 'solidarity in the key of life' in education

In schools, which build on democratic values such as in Danish schools and in schools in many (but not all) other countries teachers are not supposed to convince the students by just telling them what is right and wrong. If teachers are to teach students democratic values, they must encourage and support an overall critical approach to knowledge, methods, ideologies and norms. However, a critical approach needs to go hand in hand with hope for the future. When it comes to a topic such as environmental challenges, sustainability and the threat of climate change, this is important. An essential element in the art of teaching, I will argue, is to balance between critique and hope. With his idea of a "renewed social solidarity", Purdy offers a promising way to discuss environmental challenges because he combines a critical approach with hope.

On the one hand, he criticizes powerful agents who destroy and make a claim on 'our land, while on the other hand, he encourages a renewed understanding of solidarity. An ongoing idea is an idea of remembering. According to Purdy, we are to remember what the land was before capitalization and utilization. We are to remember that we share the land.

The critical pedagogical thinker Henry Giroux discusses in the essay 'Solidarity, Ethics, and Possibility in Critical Education' the need of combining a "language of critique with a language of possibility such educators can develop a political project that broadens the social and political context in which pedagogical activity can function as part of a counterhegemonic strategy" (Giroux, 1988, p.213). Teachers should according to Giroux play the role to be "bearers of dangerous memory" (Giroux, 1988, p.220). When it comes to how environmental challenges are to be addressed in schools Giroux offers a way of thinking which combines critique and hope. Children should learn in a critical approach to discuss knowledge, historical understanding and opinions concerning environmental challenges. However, if they determine that there is no hope and possibilities for their future, they might become passive citizens who do not take action. Therefore, a critical approach to power structures in the world must go hand in hand with new constructive ideas, such as renewed ways of thinking solidarity. The notion 'solidarity in the key of life' developed in this paper might be an option for both critical and constructive approaches.

The German educational 'Bildung' thinker Wolfgang Klafki advocates a critical constructive Didaktik (Klafki, 2002; 1996). Key elements to promote is according to Klafki 'self-determination', co-determination and solidarity. Klafki's idea of solidarity is to be elaborated and discussed in connection with his concept of 'epochal typical key problems' (Klafki, 1996: p.43-81). Klafki's idea is that students are to deal with actual problems of their own time. Environmental challenges surely must be a candidate.

Summing up

This working paper addresses the idea of 'solidarity in the key of life' as an educational value. The main idea is, inspired by Jedidah Purdy, to pursue a renewed understanding of solidarity. Furthermore, inspired by Henry Giroux and Wolfgang Klafki, I argue that teaching a topic such as environmental challenges should balance a critical approach with hope and possibility. The idea 'solidarity in the key of life' aims at this striving.

<p>Daniel P. Gibboney, Jr. Cortland Gilliam Lynda Stone</p>	<p><i>Together America and the World: Environment Issues, Participation, and Education</i></p>	<p>The threatening prospects of planet earth’s inhabitability necessarily raise questions about what can, or should, be done about climate change. Whenever such issues are raised responses typically turn to either science on the one hand or appeals to a universally shared human-fate on the other. Both the public face of science and assumptions of the human species’ common future rest on assumptions that this symposium aims to address by both negatively questioning and positively proposing alternative forms of educational and political participation in their absence.</p> <p>This symposium session is comprised of three papers, each raising a set of different, but related, issues. Common to all three papers is the question of participation, democratic and otherwise, by whom, for whom, and in what form. In this effort, political issues of facticity, race, and youth are underscored. Particular focus is paid to the United States on questions of scientific fact and youth participation, while the issues of race, activism, and commonly shared futures are taken up both stateside and abroad. As such, linking all papers in this session stands the question of political commitment, and the historic, present, and future realities, and possibilities, of collective action around “one of the greatest challenges – if not the greatest – facing humankind at the beginning of the 21st century.”</p> <p>Daniel P. Gibboney, Jr. <i>Environmental Activism in Times of ‘Epistemological Delirium’</i></p> <p>“Facts remain robust only when...supported by a common culture,” observes Bruno Latour. As such, current debates over the veracity of climate change are, in actuality, crises of facts. Questions of facticity have, moreover, precipitated a deeper issue – the prospects of unshared, “alternative” worlds. The climate science believers have one world, climate change deniers another, creating what Latour calls “epistemological delirium.” Beginning with Latour’s claims of “alternative worlds,” this paper explores the possibilities of climate activism in light of unshared realities. Following Latour’s negative questioning of the possibility for “solidarity” given the present situation, I raise alternative concepts for organizing climate activism in an unshared world but common planet.</p> <p>Cortland Gilliam <i>Green and White Futures</i></p> <p>While the sense of urgency around environmental protection and sustainability is felt by a countless many across the globe, it is not felt equally across the globe, let alone across individual nations. Communities of color are amongst the most vulnerable to the adverse consequences of environmental crises and the solutions proposed to remedy them. The participation and subsequent erasure of non-White, youth activists and organizers from around the world in environmental sustainability movements, and their subsequent erasure in global media coverage has complicated any neat hierarchy of concerns facing humanity. How is it that White and Western climate activists come to be the faces of the global youth climate movement? This paper explicates the salience of race to the education and framing of environmental and sustainability efforts. It suggests that the separation of environmental concerns from the socio-political (and thus racial) contexts that produce them not only further marginalizes the sustainability practices and contributions of non-White activists and the communities that they represent, but also engenders a harmfully narrow and often violent understanding and vision of the protective environmental policies. Put differently, any vision of a Green future for the planet, by necessity, cannot be White.</p>
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<p>David Chang</p>	<p><i>It Takes a Village: An Environmental Educator’s Case Against Childbearing</i></p>	<p>One of the underlying causes of the global ecological decline is the rapid increase in human population. Although governments are attempting to implement environmental policies and laws, less attention is directed to the problem of population growth. Despite laudable efforts on the part of educators to raise awareness of environmental issues, the ecological impact of a burgeoning population – and the ethical implications of child-bearing remains an unbroachable topic. However, the increase in human numbers is central to questions of sustainability: How can a species expect to survive in a finite terrestrial environment without limits to their population? Population growth is not the problem of developing countries, since most of the world’s ecological impact can be ascribed to capitalist industrial-consumer societies in over-developed nations. Given the dire implications of the middle-upper class lifestyle in over-developed countries, child-bearing is due for ethical review. In this paper, I argue that educational programs that are concerned with environmental ethics should have students examine the assumptions and implications of child-bearing. I consider the risks associated with this proposal, and answer objections such as the charge of misanthropy and examples from the abject history of population control policies. The paper does not advocate coercive measures for population control, but rather enjoins a pedagogical responsibility to view child-bearing as an act with ecological consequences, an act that must be subject to greater examination.</p>

SATURDAY NOVEMBER 7

Presenter	Title	Abstract
<p>Jayalakshmi Jayaraman et al.</p>	<p><i>The Elephant in the Room – Inclusion in Philosophy of Education</i></p>	<p>Inclusion in education should not be confined to experiences of learners and teachers but should also involve inclusion of educational philosophy from indigenous societies and philosophical traditions from the rest of the world in philosophy of education. Nataraja Guru, Advaita Vedanta philosopher from India, offers two likely reasons for the exclusion of indigenous and non-western philosophies of education from mainstream philosophy of education: a) the integration of religion in indigenous and non-western philosophies, and b) the current emphasis on impersonal public standards. Guru asserts that a personal system of education, centered around the relationship between teacher and student, has existed in all parts of the world irrespective of time and climate and that educators should reclaim the job of education and rescue education from impersonal public standards. Including such indigenous worldviews and philosophies in philosophy of education would benefit students and the natural world. This article promotes rigorous examination of Nataraja Guru's stance that wisdom includes both science and philosophy, which would facilitate inclusion of more diverse ideas in philosophy of education.</p> <p>Smrithi Rekha Adinarayanan will be speaking about the philosophy of Education from an Indian perspective by drawing insights from the ancient Gurukulam model of education and the relationship between the Guru (teacher) and vidyarthi (student).</p> <p>Ram Ramasubramanian will present the presence of Indian philosophy in education as practices among rural and tribal communities and the destruction of the 'Beautiful Tree' through the Colonial intervention and its persistent bureaucratic follow-up. ('Beautiful Tree' is how Gandhi presented the Indian system of education during his talk in Chatham House, London, 1931.)</p> <p>Jayalakshmi Jayaraman will present the educational thought of Nataraja Guru, who devised an original central concept for education called the Personal Factor in the education process in his D Litt thesis at the Sorbonne in 1932. She will establish its relevance to the current state of affairs in education and the world.</p>
<p>Jurate Baranova</p>	<p><i>Teaching Solidarity Through Multimodality: Philosophical Reflections</i></p>	<p>Multimodal education can flourish in the age of technologies and because of technologies. Technologies encourage the speed of intellectual movement. Does it mean that technologies for contemporary young persons' brains are necessary as the miraculous pills and without them she, he would not be able to survive? But what are the costs of technologies included into education for the brains of the new generation? Do they enlarge the brain's capacity, or do they destroy some of its capacities? What is the purpose and aim of this multimodal education? Does it develop additional brain activity, or does it restrict it? The concept of multimodality was integrated into the twenty-first-century philosophy of education from communication theory. Multimodality describes communication practices in terms of textual, aural, linguistic, spatial, and visual modes. The concept of 'multimodal' indicates the combination of two or more of different modes to create meaning. Multimodal education as a teaching tool and material includes picture books, textbooks, graphic novels, comics, posters, digital multimodal texts, such as film, animation, slide shows, e-posters, digital stories, and web pages. Multimodal education also embraces live multimodal texts, for example, dance, performance, oral storytelling. The topic of multimodal education is broadly discussed in the contemporary scientific literature on education. On the other hand, media literacy is inevitable in modern schooling. It accompanies traditional ways of education and</p>

		<p>is even beginning to replace them. New media, such as the electronic extensions of a man described by McLuhan (1964), and developed for education by Prensky (2001) and Stiegler (2008, 2010), reveal the possibility of thinking simultaneously and in different directions, compounding different fragments in a digital field. Bernard Stiegler in his book <i>Taking care of Youth and Young Generations (Prendre soin de la jeunesse et des generations, 2008)</i> describes this phenomenon caused by the prevalence of technologies as the phenomenon of attention deficit disorder and the case of generational mutation. Stiegler relies on Nancy Katherine Hayles's distinction between deep attention, cultivated in education by reading and writing and hyperattention, through the prevalence of technologies. Hayles and Stiegler are convinced that any education that leads to maturity should be based on reading and writing, since this develops deep consciousness. Stiegler notices that Hayles's suggestion of the criterion for deep attention focuses not so much on concentration of attention, but on its duration – the ability to keep it a long period of time. Thus, the following questions arise. Is it always for concentrating attention that reading and writing are necessary educational steps? How about the ability to concentrate for painting? Or listening to or composing music? Or building different objects? What about the ability of reading the signs of nature? Sometimes these arts require abilities different from accomplished writing or reading skills. Our suggestion is that by including some types of cinematic experience into multimodal education and asking philosophical questions for reflection and discussion it is also possible to return to deep attention in ecological practice. This practice encourages students to concentrate their attention on reading visual texts. The experience of including, for example, the animation film <i>The little hedgehog in the mist</i> by Russian film director Yuriy Norstein (seven minutes long) will be demonstrated and discussed as potential material for constructing ecological educational practice. The results of the teaching experiment employed by established and future primary school teachers, and their reflections on this and related ecological practices will be discussed.</p>
<p>Asger Sørensen</p>	<p><i>Expanding Democratic Citizenship Education Through Bildung. Klafki Confronting 21st Century</i></p>	<p>The problem that I am addressing is the lack of social cohesion in contemporary democratic countries confronted with social and environmental challenges, in particular the lack of interest of citizenship education. As a basic conceptual framework, I dismiss political liberalism in the narrow Rawlsian sense and employ social-democratic republicanism, asserting with Durkheim that only by being considered a valuable comprehensive doctrine, i.e. a comprehensive civic religion, can deliberative democracy also become an individual civic obligation and <i>vice versa</i>. In continuation, the idea is that democratic citizenship education may benefit from introducing into the discussion the very rich German idea of <i>Bildung</i>. In his didactical works, Wolfgang Klafki argues for recognizing both the classical heritage of <i>Bildung</i> and the ideology critique of Critical Theory, substantializing educationally the argument for coping with contemporary societal problems through democratic formation, stressing both political and environmental sustainability. Klafki's didactics is clearly political, relating explicitly to questions of justice, also in the classroom. It does, however, also aim to be a theory of learning, teaching and schooling as such, emphasizing thus the importance of cultural <i>Bildung</i> and problem solving in addition to political democracy for citizenship education. This implies appreciating other non-political, apolitical and supra-political aspects of human life, recognizing for instance as legitimate both basic human rights and anarchist recalcitrance. This very liberal emphasis, however, also has an important implication for republican and deliberative social democracy, namely by stressing that a truly democratic education implies the mutual recognition of the individual other in her or his substantial singular otherness.</p>

Nuraan Davids &
Yusef Waghid

*Deliberative
Encounters and the
Quest for
Transcendence*

In educational encounters, it seems rather inconceivable to talk about moving beyond deliberation. We do not advocate against listening, articulation, reflection and talking back. That in itself would be an odd decision and counter-intuitive to teaching and learning. Instead, we raise the challenge that educational encounters of a deliberative kind are not in itself sufficient to enhance teaching and learning in universities. In a way, we are summoned to look at other ways of making teaching and learning more deliberative. This does not mean that we are concerned about calling for more deliberation. Rather, what does interest us is to look at another important aspect of human development, which seems somewhat neglected in university teaching and learning discourses. As such, we are drawn to the seminal thoughts of the Irish ethical philosopher, Jean Iris Murdoch (1993), who considers education to be something more than a political project, which primarily requires the existence of deliberation. Considering that education involves forms of human engagement, we want to re-examine the discourse as something more than being constituted by deliberative encounters. Often in deliberative encounters, participants such as students and teachers do not necessarily place a high premium on morality as if any form of human educational encounter is devoid of moral intent. On the contrary, and drawing on Murdoch's (1993) moral notion of engaging in a quest, we want to look at deliberative encounters as a Murdochian pilgrimage of the soul (Murdoch, 1993). We understand that such a move would contribute potentially towards a different understanding of deliberative encounters – perhaps, encounters that are also spiritually motivated in addition to their intellectual experiences.

In drawing from the realm of art appreciation, Murdoch (1993) asserts that living a morally good life depends on both the cultivation of *eudemonia* (Aristotelian happiness) and *eros* (Platonic love). In her essay, 'The sublime and the good' (1997a:215), Murdoch describes love as 'the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real. Love, and so art and morals, is the discovery of reality'. Thus, for Murdoch, to live a good life is to be moral without corruption and, simultaneously, to live lovingly, is to be joyful in the pursuit of spiritual happiness (Murdoch, 1993:234). Following Murdoch's allegiance to both human happiness and love it would be quite apposite to couch morality as a condition of human consciousness that is intrinsically and by implication spiritually happy, on the one hand. On the other hand, morality also invokes the emotion of love. For the human soul to be embellished with happiness and love is tantamount to experiencing a moral life as an erotic pilgrimage or a spiritual pursuit (Murdoch, 1993:388).

The question is: what can a moral life as erotic pilgrimage do to human deliberative encounters? Moral life for humans, following Murdoch (1993:300), is guided by character and vision described as human will. To be on an erotic pilgrimage would imply that humans endeavour to have their will directed by their character and vision. According to Murdoch (1993:300), it is human will that moves us and gives our actions impetus. Thus, it is not that deliberative encounters are simply about articulations, listening and talking back, but these encounters are also shaped by will on the basis of humans' character and the vision they bring to such encounters. And, considering that having vision involves the human capability to look ahead or to transcend the taken for granted, it seems as if vision offers encounters a distinctively forward-looking concern. Equally, character brings to encounters good habit and dutiful action (Murdoch, 1993:375), those virtues that make deliberative encounters more than merely intellectual pursuits. For teachers and students, commitment to deliberative encounters means that both engage with a conscientiousness to perform responsible actions.

The teacher accepts responsibility for the student in terms of his or her learning, This responsibility takes on different forms, and could include asking about a particular student, when his or her absence is noted; it might include raising concern about a poorly performed assignment, or noticing a change in a student's conduct. In turn, the student assumes the responsibility of attending classes, of submitting work on time, and honouring the expectations of the teacher. When both the teacher and student enact responsible action, they bring into the encounters their emotiveness that puts them (and their souls) on a happy and loving (erotic) pilgrimage. In other words, when the teacher and student perform responsible actions, they do so through expressions of interest, care, respect, trust and

compassion. Deliberative encounters, if informed by vision and character, will produce more than just instrumental articulations and listening. Such encounters will also make human action dependent on looking ahead rather than simply performing action. It is here that articulations and listening might be quite limiting in the quest to cultivate deliberative encounters. Human encounters also need to draw on character and vision – or that mode of forward thinking – that has the potential to transcend deliberations.

This brings us to a discussion of how a Murdochian understanding of pilgrimage could help us transcend the limitations of prejudicial deliberative encounters. Murdoch posits that transcendence is an act which is synonymous with going beyond one's egoistic self, much like a pilgrimage or human experience towards purification brings the pilgrim supposedly in the closest presence of God (Murdoch, 1993:57). Transcending the human self is an act of doing things unselfishly and in service of a spiritual higher good and other humans in much the same way pilgrims pursue the quest for greater understanding. Acting unselfishly only becomes evident when the individual acts in relation to others, which means that, although it is the individual who undertakes a pilgrimage, the influence of that pilgrimage is made visible in and through his or her interactions with others. For Murdoch (1993), a moral person becomes suitably other-directed through what she describes as ego 'unselfing'. 'Unselfing' the ego is necessary, since, according to Murdoch, it is the main barrier to *seeing* others correctly and hence acting virtuously in relation to others.

Murdoch (1993) teaches us that if an individual desires or intends to be morally responsive to others, then her humanity requires that he or she unselfs or suppresses his or her ego. Stated differently, for Murdoch, the idea of humanity is an ethical concern, and when an individual is not morally responsive to others, such individual acts without humanity. Concomitantly, not to be morally responsive, is to act with inhumanity. What does Murdoch therefore mean with 'being morally responsive'? When are an individual's actions morally responsive, and when not? In clarifying her own ontological understanding of what it means to be moral, Murdoch poses the following question, 'Is morality to be seen as essentially and by its nature centered on the individual, or as part of a general framework of reality which includes the individual?' (Murdoch, 1997b:68). If morality is 'essentially centred on the individual' (1997b: 68), then what emerges is a 'false transcendence', because the value of the morality is attached to the human will, and not in response to a transcendent good or reality (Murdoch, 1970:52).

Hence, Murdoch is not in favour of a morality, which is 'essentially centred on the individual'. Instead, she prefers a morality in which the individual is 'held in a framework that transcends him [or her], and towards which he [or she] is tentatively moving', and in which the individual is integrating himself or herself, irrespective of however 'impossibly difficult' that task might be (Murdoch, 1997b:70). Because this framework transcends the individual and as it is tentatively moving, the framework cannot be delineated; however, it allows the individual to see others. This view ties in with Murdoch's contention that goodness serves as the framework and basis of all human existence. As explained by Ellis (2009:70), Murdoch's argument is that 'the self inhabits a moral framework which is not of its own making and which grants it [the self] the possibility of transcending its egoistic preoccupations in order to acknowledge and to act upon the moral demands of others'.

Being morally responsive in terms of a framework, which transcends the individual, implies that this framework is not constructed by any individual, and is therefore well-placed to respond to the moral needs of others. A teacher who is morally responsive in terms of a framework, which transcends his or her own socially constructed moral spaces, is one who recognises that not only are there other moral spaces, but a response is only moral when it is focused on the needs of others – in this case, the student. In addition, a morally responsive teacher does not wait for particular scenarios or engagements to arise before he or she might respond morally. Instead, he or she deliberately evokes and provokes particular points of discussion so that students might be laid bare to other ways of thinking and being. Finally, teaching and learning in a morally responsive way have nothing to do with advocating one set of morality over another; it has to do with coming toward that which is good.

		<p>Like a moral responsiveness, which responds to the need of the other, so that what is arrived at is goodness. Imagination allows the teacher the freedom to see the student as he or she is, rather, than how he or she prefers to see the student. Having the freedom to act in relation to the needs, desires and capacities of the student, as opposed to acting based on the teacher's own essential individuality and the vision of the world, provides the teacher access to a world of unexplored possibilities – both for the student, and for the teacher. In turn, the student is allowed to bring him- or herself as he or she is into the teaching encounter, without fear of rejection, marginalisation or not being seen, while simultaneously having the freedom to see him- or herself as he or she desires to be and become.</p> <p>In sum, embarking on deliberative encounters for the sake of 'unselfing' and transcending oneself could create the possibility that such encounters would be emotively guided. If the latter happens, it seems very unlikely that human prejudice, stereotyping and marginalisation of others in deliberative encounters would be imminent. The upshot is that deliberative encounters might turn out to be spiritually deepened pilgrimages. Likewise, pedagogic encounters guided by unselfing and transcending the self invariably become openings of freedom and justice where teachers and students do not act in ways to subvert one another's contributions. Rather, they are spiritually awakened to encounter one another as persons who not only require respect and acceptance but also a responsiveness that they are worthy of meaning-making who deserve to be treated as equal moral beings</p>
<p>Bianca Thoilliez</p>	<p><i>Education as a Conservative Undertaking: From Environmental Conservationism to Political Conservatism</i></p>	<p>The National Museum of Natural Sciences in Madrid (Spain) was created by Carlos III in 1771 as the Royal Cabinet of Natural History. Throughout history it has changed its name several times. The initial collection of the Royal Cabinet of Natural History consisted of the holdings and library owned by Pedro Franco Dávila, a Spanish businessman from Guayaquil (present Colombia) who donated them to the Spanish Crown. The collection contained thousands of minerals, algae, plants, animals of all kinds, stones, and bezoars of physiological origin, tools and weapons from various cultures and ages, and artistic objects made of porcelain, crystal, and precious minerals from every continent, ancient bronze pieces, sculptures, medals and headstones, works by famous painters from various schools and countries, miniatures, drawings, watercolors, and enamels. As property of the Spanish Crown, the collection grew with purchases and donations until 1984, when it was totally restructured as a modern museum. Since then, its holdings have been enhanced even further. Of great historic and scientific value, the Museum is open to the public through its permanent, temporary and travelling exhibitions. If you travel to Madrid and visit this particular museum, I would invite you to walk all along the central room and look at a series of posters hanging on the wall. There is a fascinating collection of arguments justifying the conservationist spirit of any Natural Sciences museum. Each argument goes as follows: (i) <i>The ethical principal</i>: the probability of life is tiny, for the time being known only in this strange, remote corner of the universe. Likewise, the likelihood of existing is infinitely smaller than that of not existing, and each life form is the upshot of an unrepeatable sum of improbabilities which have converged over the course of hundreds of millions of years. Thus, existing is a cosmic achievement, and keeping information on every species is worthwhile just because they exist (and this achievement itself is worth saving). (ii) <i>The aesthetic principle</i>: it is said that 'life is beautiful'. It is true that nature is the primary source of all beauty. All living things are beautiful, and any slice of biodiversity contains beauty. Gathering information from every species is worth pursuing just because each species forms part of that beauty. (iii) <i>The principle of complementarity</i>: species are not isolated entities but rather pieces in the web of life. Without different species, there is no factory of life, because species are its basic building</p>

blocks. The synergic sum of species is what sustains the cycles of life. Each species depends on many others, as they depend on it. Conservation of each cog and each gear is the first concern of any good mechanic. (iv) *The principle of precaution* (or the principle of the potential usefulness of what seems useless): if the evolution of life has managed to move from a bacterial soup to rare individuals capable of questioning themselves about the usefulness of what we do, it is precisely because we possess a certain capacity to retain the superfluous, the unusable or what at the moment seems useless. We should not run the risk of mistakenly considering a species useless (as we have already done too many times). (v) *The scientific principle*: each species is an enigma, a unique genome modelled by millions of years of evolution. Each species contains the answers to very myriad questions, and those enigmas are worth saving. (vi) *The principle of knowledge*: an unknown species may be the answer to a question we may not yet have asked, or the solution to a problem we do not yet perceive. We should do whatever it takes to find out about as many species as possible simply because knowing is better than not knowing. Our ancestral instinct of acquiring knowledge has helped human civilization advance. Moreover, the ability to understand the world depends on accumulated knowledge. Many forms of knowledge may at first seem of little use or have little potential for immediate application but are in fact essential in the long run. (vii) *The economic principle* (for those skeptical about all previous principles): all our food, a third of medicines, and a substantial number of the materials we use come from species which are or at some time have been wild. Biodiversity (that is species) underpins all the services the ecosystems have brought to humanity. They are potential resources and possible solutions to potential problems.

If you have visited its London or New York's counterparts nothing compares in size (and funding!) to Madrid's much more modest museum. But there is something very key that all such museums share: they are a material human testimony of our controversial call for collecting, classifying, preserving, and transmitting not just cultural artifacts, but nature itself: plants, animals, and complete ecosystems. The potential critique for this Western way of dealing with our relationship with nature is quite obvious: we have taken the Biblical commandment "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and every creature that crawls upon the earth" (Genesis 1:28) too far. Having taken this instruction so literally has put our entire world into a critical environmental state. However, I will not follow this particular path of inquiry. I would rather explore whether the materiality of these institutions and the values they stand for can inspire new ways to better think through contemporary education challenges. Thus, this paper aims at creating a dialogue with the Arendtian 5th principle of the *Manifesto for a post-critical pedagogy: From education for citizenship to love for the world*, where the authors state that this is the time "to acknowledge and to affirm that there is good in the world that is worth preserving" (Hodgson, Vlieghe, & Zamojski, 2017, p. 19), as a hopeful acknowledgment of the world. I consider institutions such as the National Museum of Natural Sciences in Madrid as a practical materialization of how that "good in the world that is worth preserving" can be conserved and displayed. According to Arendt (1961), education consists of an intergenerational passing on of what is worth preserving from our world, as the essence of education is mainly and mostly a conservative undertaking.

This working paper will address the complicated relations between (i) education as a conservative undertaking, (ii) increasing environmental conservationism concerns, and (iii) the rise of political conservatism. Although I am very sympathetic to the post-critical approach to reclaim the conservative undertaking of education, this is not without risks. The fact that while climate change becomes a global concern, far-right parties are beginning to incorporate green politics into their ethnonationalistic vision is evidence of how blurred the

		<p>lines can be between “green conservationism” and totalitarian forms of political conservatism. There is the assumption that “going green” is inexorably linked with a progressive political agenda, but this is, as I will try to show, a very wrong assumption. I will then focus on how and whether it is possible to make the understanding of education as a conservative undertaking compatible with the need for raising environmental conservationist awareness, while we politically avoid what I find are risky totalitarian positions.</p>
<p>Samuel Mendonça</p>	<p><i>Teaching as Dissensus in Times of Covid-19</i></p>	<p>Thinking of the teaching process as dissensus as proposed by Gert Biesta – that is, turning to students’ subjectivity, teaching that we seek to somehow awaken their desire to exist in the world as a subject – within the context of the Covid-19 Pandemic is the object of this presentation. It is impossible to ignore the fact that schooling must be rethought in the period following the pandemic. The subject matter of this investigation consists in the question: what teaching conception may be potent in the post pandemic? As hypotheses, we defend teaching as dissensus, as it necessarily includes the singularity of each student and the absence of teacher control. The essay contribution consists in presenting an alternative form of thinking post-pandemic learning.</p>
<p>Barbara Thayer-Bacon</p>	<p><i>Border Crossing: USA’s and Mexico’s Transactional Relationships</i></p>	<p>In this paper I argue that we (the USA) have the same moral obligation to welcome the stranger as was offered to us by indigenous peoples, not that long ago. My plan is to remind us of some of the historical background (ancient and more recent) that led to the dividing up of land, and the creation of borders. This will remind us how porous borders are, even before we add technological advances to the story. I then turn to some key philosophers for help who have sought to address these issues, in particular Levinas and Rancière. I argue that the idea of individuality (“I can make it on my own”) is a myth that feminist scholars such as Ruddick, Noddings, and myself have problematized, as well as classical pragmatists such as Dewey and Mead. What we have are transactional relationships with others; we are always selves-in-relation-with-others. Those others are strangers to us, in Levinas’s sense of not able to be completely known and understood, even in our most intimate relationships, just as we remain strangers to ourselves. Others help us continue to grow and learn more about ourselves. In agreement with Rancière, I argue that our relationships with others need to be based on an assumption of equality – not inequality (more wealth, guns, law on their/our side), that leads to oppression and discrimination (living illegally in the shadows, for fear of being picked up by ICE because we were unlucky enough to be born in the wrong place, at the wrong time, to the wrong family). We need to embrace the value of plurality and diversity, and recognize that “there but for the grace of God (Allah, Buddha, Yahweh, Great Spirit), go I.” Nature does not discriminate in terms of storms, floods, earthquakes, droughts and fires. As ethical human beings, I argue, we share responsibilities in caring for each other and must honour the call for help from refugees.</p>
<p>Gregory Bynum</p>	<p><i>Psychoanalytic Ecofeminist Dorothy Dinnerstein: Theorizing the Roots of Rapacity</i></p>	<p>This paper proposes that Dorothy Dinnerstein’s philosophy can help us understand the problem of mis-education that places male-dominated and “masculine” rapacity at the center of so many human endeavors, including capitalist economic exploitation and environmental exploitation. Dinnerstein argues that early childhood experiences of female domination lead to reactive and immature adult preferences for excessive, triumphant, rapacious, male rule. In Dinnerstein’s theory, the solution to this psychologically deep-rooted problem is for men to do half of the childcare work. This paper acknowledges and refutes arguments against Dinnerstein’s theory, and expounds its soundness and benefits. Dinnerstein’s thought can help us put a brake on the capitalist rapacity that threatens our</p>

		<p>very survival. Additionally, although Dinnerstein’s imperatives contradict many people’s deeply held associations between human value and traditionally gendered social roles, her thinking holds great promise for increasing human emotional and mental maturity, and for expanding possibilities of diverse, deeply individual, human self-actualization.</p>
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<p>Andrés Mejía</p>	<p><i>What Counts as an Emotional Education? An Exploration from the Complexity of Emotional Phenomena</i></p>	<p>What is an emotional education? Given the many contradictory proposals and ways of conceiving it, it is still unclear what its purposes should be or what it should consist of. From forms of emotional cultivation in Greek and Hellenistic schools – through <i>askēsis</i> – to contemporary proposals of socio-emotional education that have gained boom in educational policy and practice, such a variety can be overwhelming. In what ways are different or similar educational proposals that provide techniques for self-regulation of anger, that help us to be critical about how certain emotions are the materialization of –and a reinforcement for– cultural forms of oppression, that promote the development of empathy, that try to infuse us with political emotions or with compassion, or that try to shape our character to live more calmly, among others? And to what extent is it appropriate to say they are instances of <i>emotional education</i>?</p> <p>I propose here that understanding and taking seriously the complexity of emotional phenomena can give us clarity to understand, on the one hand, the various possibilities of emotional learning and, on the other, the conditions under which a process of emotional learning could be taken as constituting an emotional education. I will argue that this complex understanding of emotions has been largely lacking in the emotional education proposals found in the literature. The complexity of emotions has several different sources.</p> <p>Sources of complexity of emotional phenomena</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Emotions are inserted in our experience, <i>constituting</i> it, in different ways according to its duration, intensity, and emotional and behavioural phenomena which derive from them (Price, 2015). There are immediate emotional reactions, emotional episodes –which may be relatively brief or extended for months–, emotional attitudes, and emotional character traits. While immediate emotional reactions are particularly visible because of the way in which they produce abrupt changes in experience, it is emotional attitudes and emotional character traits which in the long term define the places that emotions occupy in our lives, as well as the ways in which they contribute to giving it meaning and purpose. These very different roles allow us to see how an emotional education will vary very significantly depending on the phenomena it focuses on. 2. Emotions are made up of multiple components, which holistically shape a way of seeing a situation (Ekman, 1999; Prinz, 2004; Price, 2015). Although not all components are always present, we recognize an emotion as typically constituted by some kind of triggering situation (something whose presence triggers an emotion), an intentional object (something about which we experience the emotion, or which the emotion is about), an appraisal or evaluation of that object and its significance (without this valuation necessarily implying a judgment in a strict sense), a sensation (the phenomenological experience of an emotion), a disposition to act in particular ways (consistent with the valuation of the intentional object), and a disposition to experiment other emotions, in a consistent manner, as the situation develops. 3. The emotions we experience occur as a result of, and acquire their meanings only through, our biological, cultural, and individual histories. A full understanding of the particular ways in which we experience emotions involves placing them in our histories, on multiple levels. Thus, our experiencing of emotions fulfils functions developed evolutionarily as a species (Ekman, 1999). They are also shaped and produced in particular ways in the social and political dynamics of a culture (Ahmed, 2004). And they also develop in particular ways
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according to personal life experiences of each individual (Goldie, 2000). The nature of the interaction between these three levels is complex and surely differs from one type of emotion to another. Moreover, the appearance of a particular emotion can only be understood by examining the history of the situation in which it appears. An understanding of our emotions must therefore be narrative.

4. Emotions are experienced in different ways in their relationship with the will. Some emotions can be relatively easily modified at will, while many others are experienced as reluctant, to the point of becoming *passions* (Price, 2015; Robinson, 2007). In part, this diversity comes from the multiplicity of emotional phenomena (from emotional reactions to emotional character traits), but it also depends on the ways in which these emotions were fixed in our life histories as a species, culture or individual. This ambiguity, as we shall see, defines very different ways of approaching emotional education according to whether we start from emotions as something that can be shaped or as something unmodifiable.

Some implications of the complexity of emotional phenomena

I will explore some implications of this complexity for the idea of *emotional education*, which is related to *emotional learning*: to modifications in the ways in which individuals experience emotions or with the most basic development of skills necessary to produce such modifications (e.g. identification of our own emotions and those of others).

1. Emotional learning can occur through modifications in any of the components of emotions or a set of them. This provides a very wide range of possibilities of emotional learning. Some learnings directly modify our readiness for action (e.g. techniques for self-regulating anger); others modify our general ways of appraising situations (e.g. stoic techniques such as *memento mori* and *premediatio malorum*); others modify the intentional objects of our emotions (e.g. in the transformation of guilt into political anger, in critical pedagogies); etc.

2. An emotional education must deal with the double condition of emotions of being very hard to modify in the immediate experience, while at the same time being at least somewhat more modifiable in a longer term. Given this double condition, I would like to suggest a distinction between two general modes of emotional learning: *reactive management of emotions* –which can take place especially about emotional reactions and episodes– and *emotional cultivation* –which can especially take place about emotional attitudes and character traits. These two types of emotional learning can relate through what Ledoux has called *emotional memory* (Ledoux, 1991).

3. An emotional education can be oriented towards several different purposes corresponding to various roles of emotions in our lives. I point out three such roles. First, emotions are constitutive of our being well or bad. In general, emotional education is expected to help us feel good and take care of well-being in the lives of others, both in the short and long terms (Tangney et al., 2007). Second, the evaluative component of emotions demonstrates that they are central to our understanding of the world. This occurs in several different roles: limiting the field of what is worth thinking (Damasio, 2005), marking the significance of the situation faced (Elgin, 2008; Robinson, 2007), or forming an embodied understanding in our experience (Dewey, 1934/2005; Diamond, 2003). A task for emotional education would be helping us improve our ways of understanding the world. And third, the dispositional component of emotions is configured as motivation or motor for action (Nucci, 2001). Another task of an emotional education would then be to produce the necessary motivation for the kinds of action that would allow us to move towards better individual and collective ways of life.

4. And lastly, I would like to suggest that not every emotional learning process should be considered as emotional education. An emotional education in a full manner must

		<p>simultaneously and comprehensively address the three aforementioned types of purposes – about the improvement of our well-being, understanding and motivation– rather than treating each one separately. This can happen when the individual critically inquires about the types of roles that emotions have played in the constitution of one or more senses of his life –from her history as a species, culture and individual– when she asks about the ways in which these modes of experiencing emotions are related to the questions about the person that is worth being and the type of life that is worth living, individually and collectively, and finally embarks on learning processes of both reactive management of emotions and emotional cultivation of character. This would make her learning process a genuine emotional education rather than mere indoctrination.</p>
<p>David Kennedy</p>	<p><i>Second Nature, Becoming Child, and Dialogical Schooling</i></p>	<p>The first half of this paper endeavours to trace the emergence of what Herbert Marcuse referred to as a “new sensibility” in the form of collective intelligence that cultivates the habits of social democracy. The democratic “social character” is identified as a normative form or style of subjectivity open to difference, tolerant of complexity and ambiguity, autonomous and self-organizing, and practiced in negotiating the proliferating boundary-crossings that result from the ever increasing interface of globalization and localization that is the post-modern situation. The democratic impulse affirms the possibilities in human nature that the infamous Hobbesian formulation precludes. It represents what the eco-philosopher Murray Bookchin identified as an emergent normative form of culturally mediated subjectivity that acts to “recover the continuum between our ‘first nature’ and our ‘second nature’, our natural world and our social world, our biological being and our rationality.” In Marcuse’s formulation it implies a “revolutionizing of instinctual structure, a change in the system of needs” leading to “a society organized under a new reality principle.” He characterizes this emergent form of subjectivity as “express[ing] the ascent of the life instincts over aggressiveness and guilt,” and dedicated to “the collective practice of creating an environment in which the nonaggressive, erotic, receptive faculties of man strive for the pacification [reconciliation] of man and nature.” As representative of an implicit philosophy of nature, the new sensibility evokes theory in the realm of post-humanism and vital materialism, and post (or neo) animist and vitalist theory, for which matter itself is “lively,” and exhibits agency at the ontological level. It refuses the exclusionary distinction between the inorganic and the organic, animate and inanimate, sentient and nonsentient entities, and between material and spiritual phenomena. As such it represents a dialectical recovery of a form of the relation between first and second nature that is characteristic both of some indigenous cultures, of the perennial tradition of panpsychism in Western philosophical thought, and of the ontological convictions characteristic of young children. It signals a corresponding shift in the direction of the “posthuman,” understood as a form of subjectivity that has consciously renounced an attitude of hierarchy and domination and embraced dialogue, not just in its inter- and intra-personal, but in its inter-species relations as well.</p> <p>The second half of this paper identifies a form of schooling that promises to function as a “holding environment” for the emergence of this new psychoclass. It has been present in latent or manifest form as long as democratic values and aspirations have been present in the Western social and political imaginary, and it is intimately linked to the same evolutionary impulse that the new sensibility represents. It has roots in left-libertarian and liberal reformist Enlightenment ideologies--roots that are clearly discernible, not just in the beliefs and practices of “progressive” educators, but in the contemporary “democratic education” movement. Moreover, those roots are fed by what the psychohistorian Lloyd DeMause</p>

		<p>identified as an evolutionary advance in childrearing “modes.” A hermeneutical turn in the Western adult-child relation has led to what he calls the “empathic mode,” which in turn makes dialogical schooling possible. The “enlarged self” that adult experiences in the hermeneutical encounter with childhood is a key historical element in the emergence of the new sensibility—of a second nature that enters a new relation with both the human and the non-human world of nature, and consequently, a new form of social character and practice.</p>
<p>2nd Keynote Address: Vanessa De Oliveira Andreotti</p>	<p><i>The task of education as we confront the potential for social and ecological collapse</i></p>	<p>This paper invites us to consider the task of education as we face the end of the world as we have known it. The first part of the paper offers an overview of global and educational challenges, drawing attention to how formal education has been complicit in the reproduction of historical and systemic violence, as well as unsustainability. Partially drawing on the scholarship of Sharon Todd and Gert Biesta, this section also explores the difference between, on the one hand, educational approaches that focus on the mastery of knowledge and skills and personal empowerment for one's functionality in existing systems, and, on the other hand, (non-Western) psychoanalytic educational approaches that focus on socially sanctioned denials, and that try to expand our capacity to process collective and personal traumas and to sense, relate and imagine "otherwise". The second part of the paper presents a psychoanalytic experiment called Education 2048, which attempts to create a space and the dispositions necessary for difficult conversations about the role of education in preparing us all to confront the potential for and/or likelihood of social and ecological collapse in our lifetime.</p>